@conference {36356,
	title = {Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy},
	booktitle = {Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM conference on Electronic commerce},
	year = {2013},
	pages = {215-232},
	publisher = {ACM},
	organization = {ACM},
	address = {Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA},
	abstract = {Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players{\textquoteright} utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modelling privacy in players{\textquoteright} utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).},
	isbn = {978-1-4503-1962-1},
	doi = {10.1145/2482540.2482549},
	url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2482540.2482549},
	author = {Yiling Chen and Stephen Chong and Ian A. Kash and Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan}
}
