@article {878581,
	title = {Truthful Mechanisms for Agents that Value Privacy},
	journal = {ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation (TEAC)},
	volume = {4},
	number = {3},
	year = {2016},
	abstract = {Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players{\textquoteright} utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to nontruthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modeling privacy in players{\textquoteright} utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome\&nbsp;o\&nbsp;has the property that any report of player\&nbsp;i\&nbsp;would have led to\&nbsp;o\&nbsp;with approximately the same probability, then\&nbsp;o\&nbsp;has a small privacy cost to player\&nbsp;i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modeling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number\&nbsp;n\&nbsp;of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of\&nbsp;n).},
	url = {http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?doid=2905047.2892555},
	author = {Yiling Chen and Stephen Chong and Ian Kash and Tal Moran and Salil Vadhan}
}
